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Fifty years ago, Neville Chamberlain emerged from an airplane, gestured with his 
umbrella and announced to his anxious countrymen that the abject surrender he just signed in 
Munich would assure them what the Prayer Book pleads for: "peace in our time." The major 
effect of his act was to give both umbrellas and peace a bad name for generations to come. 
Within a year, the world was at war while the Munich agreement went down in history as 
proof positive of the futility of concessions and the virtues of uncompromising strength. Its 
putative lesson has since been invoked to justify causes as diverse as the American interven-
tion in Vietnam, the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and opposition to arms control 
agreements. Nor would it surprise me if, behind the Kremlin's secretive walls, Soviet strate-
gists invoked that lesson to oppose a withdrawal from Afghanistan, Poland or Hungary, 
gravely warning of "another Munich." 
Yet is the lesson of Munich really so simple, that appeasement is bad and uncompro-
mising strength good? Unquestionably, the Munich agreement was one of the pivotal 
tragedies of our time. By surrendering Czechoslovakia to Hitler, the Western democracies 
brought on precisely what they feared. Their surrender broke the back of German opposition 
to Hitler. It destroyed the one genuinely free, democratic state east of the Rhine and helped 
discredit democracy in that part of the world. It did not tum Hitler's fury toward the east; in-
stead, it armed him with state-of-the-art weaponry for a war which effectively eliminated both 
France and the British Empire as world powers and drew Soviet might into the very heart of 
Europe. 
It is, however, far from clear that the outcome would have been significantly different 
had the allies rejected all compromise and opted for war. The wishful "if only" scenario has 
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traditionally been that German opposition, emboldened by a vigorous French and Czechoslo-
vak attack, would have overthrown Hitler and saved the world a second world war. All 
available evidence, however, makes a rather less sanguine scenario more likely. There is ab-
solutely no reason to suppose that the dispirited French draftees would have fought any more 
vigorously in 1938 than they did a year later. For all their valor, the Czechs would have, in 
all likelihood, had their hands too full of their own hostile minorities to mount a vigorous at-
tack on Germany, for which they were neither armed nor prepared in any case. Even if 
France managed to dispatch an expeditionary force to aid them, through the Mediterranean, 
the Black Sea and Romania, it seems most unlikely that such a force would have arrived in 
time to be much use. Nor does it seem likely that Stalin would have been willing to provide 
effective aid and to withdraw again when done. It seems far more likely that he would have 
done what he in fact did a year later -- allied himself with Hitler to deflect him toward the 
west, perhaps finishing off Poland along the way. 
Unquestionably, the Franco-British attempt at last-minute compromise was as con-
temptible as it was futile, but it seems highly doubtful that an uncompromising stance would 
have been any more effective. By then, it was simply too late, whether for compromise or 
for force. The pieces were all in place, set there by twenty years of French foreign policy. 
Unquestionably, it would have been more honorable had the West fought rather than surren-
dered, but it seems doubtful that such a course would have accomplished anything more than 
to discredit policy of force as much as the attempt at compromise discredited "appeasement." 
Thus I would suggest that what is interesting is not what happened at Munich but rather what 
led to Munich, the entire Franco-British policy on the continent since the end of the war to 
end all wars. 
Interestingly enough, that strategy is not marked by a posture of appeasement as by 
its very opposite, a policy of uncompromising strength. The center piece of that strategy is 
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French policy toward Germany in the wake of its defeat. At that point, there was certainly 
significant room for "appeasement." Germany was ready for a change. The agony of war 
and defeat had discredited the arrogant "Prussian" model of German national identity. Had 
the French followed the policy commended by Abraham Lincoln at the close of America's 
war between the states-- "with malice toward none, with charity toward all"-- as the Ameri-
cans did after the second world war, Germany might well have responded as it responded to 
the American strategy and might have become a democratic core of an Europe at peace. 
In 1918, however, the French were in no mood for appeasement. They opted instead 
for a policy of uncompromising strength, designed to crush and humiliate their erstwhile op-
ponent. Rather than making a mighty effort to encourage and support the new republican 
government that was struggling to transform Germany, they did everything to undercut it. 
While a policy of generosity would have at least opened a democratic, peaceful option for 
Germany, the policy of strength left it with defiance as the only option. 
Mutatis mutandis, the same can be said of French policy toward its former ally, Rus-
sia, as well. Here, too, the war and the defeat discredited the old regime. Russia, too, was 
ready for something new. To be sure, in the case of Russia it is far less clear that the country 
was capable of responding to a policy of generosity. Still, even here it is clear that the policy 
of strength, including an armed intervention on behalf of the most discredited, most corrupt 
remnants of the old regime-- as Admiral Kolchak in Siberia-- helped mightily to rally the 
undecided Bolshevik cause. Once again, while a policy of generosity might have helped 
build the preconditions of peace, the policy of strength sowed the seeds of future conflict. 
Less dramatically, though for me more painfully, similar reflections apply in 
Czechoslovakia. To be sure, the Czechs were far more victims than villains. They seized no 
alien territory: the western boundaries of the restored Czech state were what they had been 
for centuries, at least since the 1350s. Centuries of Austrian rule, however, had encouraged 
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the growth of a strong German minority within the traditional Czech lands. Nor was the in-
corporation of Slovakia in the Czech cause in the latter half of the 19th century and in the 
Czechoslovak state in 1918 an act of aggrandizement as much as an act of generosity: after a 
millennium of Magyar rule, the Slovaks had little hope of revival without Czech help. The 
new boundary in the south of Slovakia, where no boundary had existed for a thousand years, 
did incorporate nearly half a million ethnic Magyars in the republic, although that was far 
more the work of French military cartographers than of the Czechs. Altogether, the Czechs 
inherited rather than created their multinational state. 
Again, and in fairness to the Czechs, the new republic offered its ethnic minorities far 
more freedom, justice and opportunity than of any neighboring states. Given a century of 
peace, Czechoslovakia might well have become another Switzerland, winning the allegiance 
of a heterogeneous population for a common ideal. The shift in minority attitudes toward 
Czechoslovakia during the frrstten peaceful years, before the depression and the rise of Hitler 
put an end to it, does suggest much. 
Yet here again, it was a policy of generosity towards the minorities -- of 
"appeasement," if you wish, bitterly criticized by Czech nationalists, that strengthened the 
new republic and the policy of strength, and of Czech centralism, strongly encouraged by the 
French general staff, that weakened the support of Czechoslovakia's non-Czech nationalities 
for the new state. At the time, it did not seem to matter: the Czechs were in charge, enjoying 
full French support, the others simply had to live with it. 
It was, though, the consequences of a policy of strength, not of generosity, that pre-
pared the way to the dead end of Munich. French policy toward Germany and Russia as-
sured France of two enemies, in place of an enemy and an ally. France responded to the new 
situation with its system of alliances. Poland and Czechoslovakia were to play the role Rus-
sia once played, that of an ally in Germany's rear. However, with Soviet Russia now also 
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perceived as an enemy, they were called upon to play the traditional German role as well, that 
of a cordon sanitaire against possible Russian expansion. 
With the revival of German strength, this inner contradiction proved fatal. At Mu-
nich, Hitler forced France to choose: should France's allies be used against Germany -- or 
Germany against the Soviet Union? To great many Frenchmen, Hitler, however odious, 
came to appear as a more effective barrier against the Soviets than a democratic Czechoslo-
vakia -with its legal Communist party and its treaty with the Soviet Union. There were, to be 
sure, residual sympathies for Czechoslovak democracy in the way. However, Czechoslo-
vakia's failure to win the allegiance of its minorities offered an excuse. Unconvincing though 
it was even at the time, the French could console themselves that they were not betraying the 
Czechs, only redrawing Czechoslovakia's boundaries along ethnic lines. In retrospect, Mu-
nich appears less a failure of appeasement than a failure of a particularly odious bit of re-
alpolitik, a failure of a policy of strength rather than generosity over the years. 
Why, then, did France consistently choose a policy, in Germany, in Russia, even in 
Czechoslovakia, which was bound to generate maximal hostility in situations when it could 
have afforded to be generous? Here a philosophical rather than an empirical analysis might 
well prove most helpful -- an analysis of the philosophical prism, of the philosophical as-
sumptions about the nature of good and evil through which the French read the lessons of 
history. 
Speaking in rather compressed philosophical shorthand, I would suggest that the con-
ceptual prism that led the West from Versailles to Munich was essentially a Manichean one. 
It is the assumption that reality is ultimately not one but two, and that history is the story of a 
basic conflict of two opposed forces, Good and Evil, locked in an ongoing struggle. On 
such a reading, in any historical situation we are dealing with a conflict between Good and 
Evil, and any compromise between them is a victory for Evil. For Evil is simply and purely 
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evil, incapable of any goodness. It is incapable of compromising, only of taking advantage 
of any sign of weakness on the part of the Good. The Good must oppose it relentlessly, 
uncompromisingly, never yielding an inch. There can be no resolutions, only victories and 
defeats in a struggle without compromise and without quarter. 
In polarized historical situations, a Manichean perspective can appear quite persua-
sive. That was how the world in fact appeared to Lenin and, even more so, to his heir and 
successor, Stalin. In our time, we might very well label it the "Stalinist" rather than 
Manichean view of history --except that it was a view shared by some of Stalin's most ve-
hement opponents. When John Foster Dulles asserted that "neutrality is treason," he was 
speaking from a Manichean perspective -- and Stalin's policies did much to make it persua-
sive. Both the reality of the Great War-- hostages shot, libraries burnt, poison gas released 
in the trenches-- and the rhetoric used to fight the war would certainly have helped convince 
the French, and the Czechs, that they were the force of Good while Germany was simply 
Evil. Given that conviction, any policy of generosity would have appeared as folly, weak-
ness, and only a policy of strength realistic. Evil must be crushed. 
The Manichean perspective, however, is problematic already philosophically. How is 
Evil conceivable as a positive force at all? Evil, after all, is the will to destruction: it would 
self-destruct. We can conceive of Good as a positive force: Good is the affirmation of be-
ing. But Evil is negation: how can it even posit itself? Philosophically, an Augustinian 
reading is rather more persuasive. Being is one, and it is good. Evil is not an autonomous 
reality: it is a corruption of the Good. Frustrated in its attempt as self-fulfillment, a part of 
the Good turns to destruction and so comes to function as evil. 
So stated, the contrast might appear academic to the point of meaninglessness. Con-
sider it, though, in a very ordinary practical application. Anti-Semitism is one of the clearest 
examples of pure evil I know, a will to destruction. How comes it about? On a Manichean 
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reading, we would have to say that some people simply are anti-Semites, just as others re-
spect their fellow humans: that's the way it is . Anti-Semites are evil, respectful persons are 
good, and compromise between them is permissible. The anti-Semites must simply be 
crushed. Or, as German acquaintance told me in 1953, "Germany must free itself of anti-
Semitism. All the anti-Semites should be rounded up and shot." 
On an Augustinian reading, we would argue differently. Anti-Semitism is no positive 
reality of its own. It is a vicious perversion of an impulse to good. Specifically, we could 
argue, humans all seek a sense of their own worth. When they are blocked from achieving it, 
whether by an oppressive social system or by their own sloth, they seek a substitute in op-
pressing their fellow humans. In fact, anti-Semitism has been most virulent in oppressed and 
oppressive societies. Seeking to crush the anti-Semite will make it more virulent: anti-
Semitism must be cured. 
While in our fiery rhetoric the Manichean/Stalinist perception of evil as a force to be 
crushed may be popular, in our daily practice it is even more problematic than in philosophy. 
For one, it is devilishly hard to identify any man or society as TilE GOOD, pure and simple. 
We can always convince ourselves that we represent The Good, but that conviction blinds us 
and makes it impossible to correct our own flaws. We can likewise always convince our-
selves that our opponents are pure Evil, but that makes it incomprehensible why so many 
people are willing to support them and, still worse, makes it impossible for us to find any 
strategy for dealing with our opponents other that seeking to crush them. When push comes 
to shove, such perception becomes fatal , leaving us with only the options of surrender or de-
struction. 
Munich, I would suggest, demonstrated less the bankruptcy of appeasement than the 
utter self-destructive bankruptcy of the Manichean vision of the world. Certainly, France 
should have fought, whatever the consequences. Its inept attempt at last-minute appeasement 
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cost it much and won it nothing but contempt. But that is not a lesson we could generalize. 
There are times to make peace: the real lesson of Munich is that the Manichean perception of 
reality makes it impossible for humans to recognize the need of a time and to respond appro-
priately. 
That, unfortunately, is also the unlearned lesson of Munich. Reflections on the Mu-
nich Dictate routinely restrict themselves to a rather academic debate about the virtues of war 
and appeasement as instruments of foreign policy while the world continues to prepare new 
Munichs: situations in which evil can only be fought-- and so triumphs, one way or another. 
The Lesson of Munich shall have been learned only if we ever learn the importance of gen-
erosity, in curing evil before it becomes so powerful and autonomous that the only option left 
is to fight it -- or surrender to it. 
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